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omari scott simmons*
Corporate Reform as a Credence Service
Regulators get to the point of their incompetence and create the crisis because
they fail to regulate, and then use the crisis as the argument for more power,
and so now you have the Council of Regulators made up by the very same
people who created the crisis in the first place.1
i. introduction
With the recent meltdown of the U.S. economy, there is no shortage of
blameworthy corporate directors and managers.2 But one cannot ignore another
significant dimension of the current crisis: the crucial role of lawmakers and the
need to reform the reformers. In a sense, corporate governance reform is like a
service: corporate constituents (e.g., managers, shareholders, employees, and popu-
list groups) function like consumers, and corporate lawmakers (e.g., federal gov-
ernment and the State of Delaware) function as monopoly suppliers of reform
services.3 These reform services, however, exhibit credence characteristics, which
are service attributes whose quality cannot be fully determined even after signifi-
cant use.4 Examples of services with substantial credence characteristics include au-
© 2010 Omari Scott Simmons.
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. LL.M., 2001, University of
Cambridge, Pembroke College; J.D., 1999, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1996, Wake Forest University. I
would like to thank all of the participants in the 2009 University of Maryland School of Law Roundtable on
Corporate Governance and Securities Responses to the Financial Crisis for their valuable insights.
1. Brooke Masters, After the Fall, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 31, 2009, at 3 (quoting Eliot Spitzer who
criticizes bank regulators and the securities industry).
2. See, e.g., Roben Farzad, Who’s Looking Out for Wall Street? This Election Year, Shamed and Battered
Financial Firms Face a Leadership Crisis, Bus. Wk., Mar. 3, 2008, at 82 (“Shares of Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and
Bear Stearns have been cut in half, their CEOs ousted in rapid succession.”); James R. Hagerty & Joann S.
Lublin, Countrywide CEO Ripped by Advisory Group, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2007, at A2 (discussing the letter
CtW Investment Group sent to Countrywide Financial Corporation, urging Countrywide to remove its chair-
man because of his failures during the financial crisis); Paul Ingrassia, How GM Lost Its Way, Wall St. J., June
2, 2009, at A21 (noting that decades of bad decisions were the cause of General Motors’ bankruptcy); Liam
Pleven, AIG Debacle Not My Fault, Says Greenberg; Testifies Today, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 2009, at C1 (stating that
an investigation into AIG’s accounting practices forced CEO Maurice R. Greenberg to step down).
3. In the monopolist scenario, the consumer does not search. See Ting Liu, Credence Goods Markets with
Conscientious and Selfish Experts 6 (Boston Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 58, 2006), available at
http://www.bu.edu/econ/workingpapers/workingpapers_2006.html (“In my model, there is a monopolist ex-
pert and the consumer does not search.”).
4. See, e.g., Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. &
Econ. 67, 68–69 (1973) (“Credence qualities are those which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in
journal of business & technology law 113
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Corporate Reform as a Credence Service
tomobile repair services, certain medical treatments, and even spiritual guidance.5
Credence characteristics, at least in the short-term, make it difficult for corporate
constituents to discern the impact of corporate reform due to information asym-
metries.6 In light of these informational constraints, corporate constituents nor-
mally rely on an array of decision-making heuristics as a risk reduction strategy.
These decision-making heuristics often include: (i) third parties and reputational
intermediaries (e.g., gatekeepers, institutional investors, advisory services, academ-
ics, and corporate watchdogs);7 (ii) lawmaker credible commitment and brand
equity;8 and (iii) legitimizing democratic procedures (e.g., participation, indepen-
dence, and disclosure).9 As the current crisis reveals, corporate constituent overre-
liance on these heuristics may not adequately prevent corporate opportunism.
Making matters worse, the unobservable impact of corporate reform (i.e., credence
characteristics) creates perverse incentives for lawmakers (on the supply side) to
engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of corporate constituents (on the
demand side), who are lulled into a false sense of security.10 This important chapter
in the story of the current economic crisis and corporate scandals cannot be ig-
nored because it highlights the real potential for supply-side (i.e., lawmaker) ineffi-
normal use.”); Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Asher Wolinsky, Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in
the Market for Expert Advice, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 417, 417 (2003) (stating that credence services are plagued
with information problems because they are “not easily or objectively measurable”); Asher Wolinksy, Competi-
tion in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services, 24 RAND J. Econ. 380, 382 (1993) (stating that the information
problem with credence goods is that customers remain uncertain about their exact nature).
5. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Re-
form, 62 SMU L. Rev. 299, 307, 318 (2009).
6. Corporate lawmakers not only provide reform services, but also act as experts and diagnose corporate
governance problems. There are two types of asymmetry implicated by credence characteristics. See Brian Roe
& Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Ap-
proaches, 89 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1020, 1020 n.1 (2007). The first type involves the customer’s inability to know
their needs or diagnose their problem. Id. The second type of asymmetry involves the customer’s inability to
determine the level of service necessary. Id. The interplay between these concepts exacerbates the customer’s
dilemma because “consumer ignorance and [the] additional cost of separate diagnosis and repair provide moti-
vation for a service firm to defraud its customers.” Darby & Karni, supra note 4, at 77.
7. See generally John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance
(2006); Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2010) (examining how various proxy advisory firms make their recommendations and the differences among
them); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 53 (1986) (discussing “gatekeeper liability” imposed on those who are in a position to prevent corporate
misconduct).
8. See generally Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market
for Corporate Law, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1129 (2008) (describing the impact of the Delaware “brand” on corpo-
rations’ decisions of where to incorporate); Simmons, supra note 5 (discussing the credence characteristics of R
executive compensation reform).
9. See generally Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. Corp. L. 447 (2008) (arguing
that too much emphasis is placed on “independence” in corporate governance); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive
Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1389 (2006) (comparing and con-
trasting the operations of the Electoral College with the operations of corporate boards of directors).
10. Simmons, supra note 5, at 308 (detailing the implications credence characteristics have on corporate
reform); see also Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. Econ. 107, 111 (1997)
(asserting that even ex post, consumers have difficulty determining the level of service needed ex ante).
114 journal of business & technology law
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Omari Scott Simmons
ciencies and the need to discipline lawmaker behavior as well as enhance lawmaker
competence.
ii. the legal backdrop
The legacies of Enron, Citigroup, AIG, and other examples of corporate dysfunc-
tion reveal that traditional corporate law does not, alone, adequately address the
problem of corporate opportunism.11 Traditional corporate law and theory, charac-
terized by shareholder-director dualism, say very little about the internal corporate
organization, multiple layers of management, and how companies in specific in-
dustries should legally pursue the efficient production of products12 that customers
value.13  Corporate operations are the sum of various processes such as manufac-
turing, sales and marketing, finance and accounting, information technology, logis-
tics, and research and development. These internal operational processes in
conjunction with corporate culture ultimately determine the profitability and sus-
tainability of a business enterprise. In a sense, corporate law functions like book-
ends and does not address a broad range of corporate activity leaving it to
managers, in most cases, to fill the gaps. Most routine operational decisions fall
into the category of enterprise decisions.14  Enterprise decisions are standard deci-
sions made by management, such as the decision to build a foreign production
plant or what products to produce.15  These decisions are often protected under
state law via the business judgment rule that rightfully vests skilled managers with
the authority and protection to make countless corporate decisions without the
prospect of judicial intervention and second-guessing.16 Meanwhile, the federal
11. See generally Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2008, at A29 (dis-
cussing the looming failure of AIG and its use of credit default swaps); Jeffrey L. Seglin, The Right Thing; Will
More Rules Yield Better Corporate Behavior?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2002, §3, at 4 (describing Enron as an
example of bad corporate behavior); Ben White & Vikas Bajaj, Mounting Woes at Citigroup Began with Bank’s
Failed Bid for Wachovia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2008, at B1 (noting that more than half of Citigroup’s market
value vanished in five days after a failed bid for Wachovia and that the disparate parts of the corporation had
never been a “functional family”).
12. For purposes of this article, a product may include both goods and services.
13. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unin-
tended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 807–08 (2001) (describing the un-
derestimation of middle management in the study of corporate governance). But see Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (recognizing the application of fiduciary duties to non-director corporate of-
ficers). See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of What?), 2 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 153
(2005).
14. See generally E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus.
Law. 393, 394 (1997) (discussing the types of decisions Delaware courts address, which include enterprise,
ownership, and oversight decisions). Ownership decisions involve ownership changes, such as mergers, acquisi-
tions, and corporate takeovers. Id. Oversight decisions concern managers’ monitoring role, such as ensuring
employees execute their responsibilities in compliance with the law. Id.
15. See id.
16. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is an acknowledg-
ment of the managerial prerogatives . . . .”). Professor Robert Clark describes the business judgment rule as
follows:
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 115
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Corporate Reform as a Credence Service
government (i.e., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)), to a large ex-
tent, regulates the external trading of securities and disclosure without addressing
the internal affairs of the corporation.17
On balance, American corporate law is conservative in form and function. Here,
the use of the conservative label is value neutral. Historically, lawmakers have been
reluctant to upset the internal power relationships between management and share-
holders as well as address operational details. Instead, lawmakers have: (i) out-
sourced such reform to third-party gatekeepers, reputational intermediaries, and
the market;18 (ii) emphasized democratically symbolic procedures reflecting values
such as independence, participation, and transparency;19 and (iii) regulated busi-
ness activity indirectly or outside of the traditional corporate law context (e.g., tax,
antitrust, environmental, banking, and labor laws).20 Thus, the content of tradi-
tional corporate law contains significant gaps, lacks contextual specificity, and pro-
vides substantial managerial discretion that further makes the laws’ impact on
corporate opportunism difficult to discern.
iii. implications for the current crisis
A. Public Outrage
In the wake of the economic crisis, the Obama administration, Congress, and par-
ticularly the SEC have experienced (whether inherited or not) significant public
backlash concerning the handling of an array of issues from corporate fraud to
executive compensation.21 Recently, the SEC received a scathing report from David
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise
of business judgment—even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain
exceptions apply.
Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 123 (1986); see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law
278–79 (2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable
for (or otherwise second guessing) business decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable
minds might disagree. This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically involve taking
calculated risks.”).
17. See Simmons, supra note 5, at 327–29 (“There is a federal reluctance to directly regulate the internal R
affairs of the corporation . . . .”). Sarbanes-Oxley, however, is a notable exception.
18. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the historic practice of separating ownership and control
requires that “both shareholders and the board must depend on gatekeepers for an unbiased flow of
information”).
19. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395
(1983); Simmons, supra note 5, at 341–42 (“[T]he listing rules emphasize pay-for-performance and indepen-
dence.”); Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, Fin. Times (Asia), July 9, 2009, at 9
(highlighting the tension between envisioning the corporation as a democracy versus a bureaucracy).
20. There are numerous laws and regulations impacting business enterprise that should not be overlooked.
See Clark, supra note 16, at 30–32 (discussing labor laws, federal bankruptcy laws, reorganization statutes,
consumer protection laws, antitrust laws, trade laws, environmental laws, and tax laws).
21. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 15, 2009, at A1 (“The payment of so much money [to AIG] . . . will fuel a popular backlash against the
government’s efforts to prop up Wall Street. Past bonuses already have prompted President Obama and Con-
116 journal of business & technology law
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Kotz, the SEC inspector general, who indicated that the SEC suffered “systematic
breakdowns” in its investigation of Bernie Madoff’s 17-year-long Ponzi scheme.22
Ironically, the State of Delaware, the other partner in the U.S. corporate reform
joint venture, has, to an extent, escaped the heightened scrutiny and public out-
rage.23 This, however, is not a coincidence. Much of Delaware’s corporate law (e.g.,
fiduciary duties) has been developed through its common law courts which are, to
a substantial degree, politically independent and lauded for their expertise and effi-
cient dispute resolution.24 The development of corporate law in Delaware is largely
incremental (i.e., on a case-by-case basis), inevitably plaintiff driven, and has an ex
post orientation. By nature and design, courts, especially those with appointed
judges, cannot respond to political pressures like legislatures and, to a lesser degree,
agencies.25 These factors, in part, explain the lack of a public backlash against the
state of Delaware, particularly its courts.26 Accordingly, the ensuing political-capi-
tal-maximization discussion more accurately depicts the actions of lawmakers who
are either elected or appointed for shorter terms; it is less likely to apply to ap-
pointed judicial officers, such as those serving on Delaware’s business courts.27
B. Credence Characteristics
Even in the midst of public pressure to reform, credence characteristics create the
risk that lawmakers may camouflage unnecessary or superficial reforms in order to
gress to impose tough rules on corporate executive compensation at firms bailed out with taxpayer money.”);
Adam Nagourney, Bracing for Bailout Backlash, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2009, at A1 (discussing the Obama ad-
ministration’s concern that a populist anger at financial institutions could end up being directed at Congress
and the White House).
22. Tom Braithwaite, SEC Hires Goldman Alumnus to Head Enforcement Division, Fin. Times (U.S.A.),
Oct. 17, 2009, at 3.
23. See Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. Corp. L. 771, 772 (2009)
(“In 2008, for the seventh consecutive year, Delaware’s judicial system was ranked first among state courts for
creating a fair and reasonable litigation environment . . . .”).
24. See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L.
675, 700 (2009) (examining various Delaware court decisions on fiduciary duty, which have set guidelines for
corporate directors).
25. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory,
1990 BYU L. Rev. 827, 831–32 (examining the limits of public choice theory to adequately describe judicial
behavior); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1967 (1991) (“Devel-
oping a theory that relies upon judges’ responsiveness to political pressures . . . presents something of a puz-
zle.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 70 (1987)
(asserting that judges lack incentives to respond to interest-group pressures).
26. The Delaware judiciary is celebrated for its expertise, competence, and efficiency. See Holland, supra,
note 23, at 776–78; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 Conn. L. Rev.
619, 626 (2005) (discussing the corporate law expertise of Delaware’s chancery court judges).
27. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 23, at 776–78 (describing historical and modern attempts “to eliminate
political influence from the [Delaware] judiciary to the fullest extent possible”). But see Ehud Kamar, The
Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, 1910–11 (1998)
(raising the possibility that Delaware uses its judge-oriented corporate law to stifle rival jurisdictions).
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 117
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Corporate Reform as a Credence Service
maximize political capital or conceal their lack of expertise or competence.28 In
essence, there are two dimensions to this problem: (i) the fraudulent expert prob-
lem; and (ii) the incompetent expert problem.29 Both dimensions of the credence
characteristic problem threaten the prospect of optimal reform and are costly. Yet
their resolutions differ.30 These issues highlight potential weakness in the federal-
state joint venture to regulate publicly traded corporations.
1. Fraudulent Expert Problem
With respect to the fraudulent expert problem, the key concern is whether corpo-
rate constituents can discipline lawmakers who seek to maximize political capital
via concealing a pre-textual purpose. Addressing the fraudulent expert problem
does not necessarily require more government expenditures or resources, “but only
a [lawmaker’s] decision to stop” and perhaps some degree of constituent pressure.31
Depending on their reliability (which is far from guaranteed), the third party and
intangible decision-making heuristics available to corporate constituents may ex-
pose lawmaker opportunism and also limit lawmaker discretion.32 The mere threat
of losing political capital may constrain lawmaker opportunism and prompt
lawmakers to cease and desist. A lawmaker decision to cease and desist might entail
earnestly crafting more meaningful reforms or enforcing laws already on the books.
But, even with the threat of losing political capital, lawmakers may still act oppor-
tunistically as the following discussion illustrates.
Generally, lawmaker incentives to reform may disappear where no transfer of
political goodwill is involved.33 Meanwhile, corporate constituents, particularly
those with greater informational constraints, find it difficult to determine clear
winners and losers because credence characteristics make it easier for lawmakers to
camouflage their true intentions.34 By the time corporate constituents, particularly
28. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265, 275–78 (1990) (discussing how
Congress can shift blame by deferring to federal agencies and, even more so, to state lawmakers); Simmons,
supra note 5, at 307–08 (discussing how credence characteristics can enable “opportunistic lawmaker R
behavior”).
29. See Darby & Karni, supra note 4, at 83 (explaining that reducing fraud requires no additional resources R
whereas reducing incompetence requires additional resources).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Lawrence Mitchell, Op-Ed., Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, Fin. Times (Asia), July 8,
2009, at 9, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fac881b6-6be5-11de-9320-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check
=1 (questioning the reliability of institutional investors as stewards of good governance).
33. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211, 212 (1976)
(explaining that where there is no transfer of wealth or goodwill to political representatives, there will be no
incentive for lawmakers to effect reform); Simmons, supra note 5, at 357 (discussing how lawmakers will
continue to respond and will be expected to continue to respond to corporate constituencies that contribute
political capital).
34. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817,
1820 (2007) (“There is no clear-cut answer to the question of how much SOX benefits investors . . . .”).
118 journal of business & technology law
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those with information asymmetries, discern the impact of a particular regulation,
public outrage has waned, only to reappear in the future with the next scandal or
economic downturn. Here, political incentives and short-termism may hinder ear-
nest exploration of issues, resulting in modest, incremental, or superficial change.
Additionally, rationally ignorant constituents concerned about macro-economic
performance may respond by favoring certain reform policies, even if such policies
have a trivial impact on the national economy or their own personal circum-
stances.35 Historically, executive pay reform is a prime example of this phenome-
non.36 The market for political capital is often too imperfect to serve as an adequate
restraint on lawmaker opportunism.37
Corporate scandals and economic turmoil, however, may (and sometimes do)
alter “the distribution of political power and create opportunities for public policy
entrepreneurs to rearrange things to their advantage.”38 Diffuse constituencies, de-
spite lacking organization, may nonetheless participate in the political process
when they are provided with an easy-to-digest, politically salient issue that “com-
mands attention and motivates action in the absence of political organization.”39 In
past periods of scandal and economic crisis, lawmakers have indeed responded to
public outrage. But, the credence characteristics of corporate governance reform
have given lawmakers added discretion or a smokescreen that is often used for
incremental, moderate, or superficial corporate reforms.40 Within this context, both
lawmaker action and inaction can be problematic. Some legal observers have ex-
pressed concern over corporate lawmakers’ “crisis-mode” regulation or “knee-jerk”
reform responses during periods of economic turmoil that are too onerous.41 This
concern, although relevant, is often overstated in the corporate reform context.42
35. Roger G. Noll, Comments on Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of
Deregulation, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1, 52 (Martin Neil Baily &
Clifford Winston eds., 1989).
36. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street Follies: The Next Act, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2009, § Wk, at 1
(discussing how reformers focus on issues that enrage the public, such as executive compensation, instead of
focusing on less polarizing issues that have a greater effect on the national economy); see also Simmons, supra
note 5, at 363–64 (“The overemphasis on executive compensation functions as a . . . diversion from other
pertinent socio-economic issues, like the minimum wage, health insurance, retirement accounts, education,
and social security . . . .”).
37. It is important to note that consumers must contend with the fraudulent expert problem as well as the
incompetent expert problem. See Darby & Karni, supra note 4, at 83 (explaining the distinction between the R
social costs of reducing fraud and reducing incompetence); see also infra Part III.B.2 (explaining the incompe-
tent expert problem).
38. General Discussion on Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregula-
tion, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1, 58 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford
Winston eds., 1989).
39. Noll, supra note 35, at 51–52.
40. Simmons, supra note 5, at 362–65 (“Credence characteristics . . . provide lawmakers with greater
latitude to maintain political capital without making significant change.”).
41. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
Yale L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (explaining SOX’s shortcomings as a product of crisis-mode legislation).
42. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It
Might Just Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 923–41 (2003) (asserting that major scandals at Enron, WorldCom,
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 119
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Corporate Reform as a Credence Service
Viewed through the prism of credence characteristics, Sarbanes-Oxley and other
so-called far-reaching reforms seem more moderate than revolutionary.43
2. Incompetent Expert Problem
With regard to the incompetent expert problem, the key concern is boosting the
capabilities, experience, and competencies of lawmakers. Addressing the incompe-
tent expert problem and bolstering lawmaker expertise requires a different tact
than addressing the fraudulent expert issue. Combating lawmaker deficits in exper-
tise requires more than third parties and decision-making heuristics exposing defi-
cits in lawmaker competence; it requires significant government (i.e., supply side)
expenditures to boost an array of competencies and capabilities, such as prevention
and enforcement resources, industry-specific knowledge, flexible and rapid action,
private-public collaboration, and inter-agency coordination.44 The current capabili-
ties of corporate lawmakers simply do not match those of the regulated. Existing
reforms often lag far behind industry trends and transformations. Consequently,
lawmakers are often regulating historic problems rather than current or future is-
sues on the horizon. Matching the capabilities of regulated entities and keeping up
with all industry trends and transformations is perhaps too ambitious, but closing
an unacceptable gap is not.
To help address this gap, corporate lawmakers can harness internal industry ex-
pertise. Ironically, the Obama administration has endured significant criticism for
its hiring of Wall Street bank insiders and its apparent closeness to Wall Street.45 In
some instances, the Administration has attempted to leverage the expertise of fi-
nancial industry insiders outside of the politicized appointments mechanism in an
attempt to mitigate public outrage.46 Although some degree of criticism and public
Global Crossing, Qwest, and (to an extent) congressional deference and non-support for stricter SEC rules
during the boom period of the 1990s, led to an environment where lawmakers felt, at the very least, that they
must symbolically undertake some major legislative action in the business sector); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good
Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L.J. 1, 7–8 (2005)
(asserting that the duty of good faith evolved in the “environment of sturm und drang in corporate governance”
after the public scandals of WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco brought into question the current American corporate
governance model).
43. Simmons, supra note 5, at 362 (asserting that even during periods of economic turmoil, the credence R
characteristics of corporate reform afford lawmakers considerable discretion to respond to perceived crises in a
moderate fashion).
44. See, e.g., Bill McConnell, SEC’s Schapiro Seeks More Powers, Daily Deal, July 14, 2009, (outlining the
sweeping regulatory proposals that the SEC needs to implement to address the shortcomings in the oversight of
the financial services industry).
45. See, e.g., Tom Braithwaite, SEC Hires Goldman Alumnus to Head Enforcement Division, Fin. Times
(U.S.A.), Oct. 17, 2009, at 3 (noting the “revolving door” between the banking industry and government
agencies); Sean Lengell, Wall Street Official to Lead SEC Fraud Branch Key to Obama’s Plan to Reform the
Agency, Wash. Times, Oct. 17, 2009, at A1 (quoting Senator John McCain’s posting on Twitter, criticizing the
appointment of Adam Storch to the SEC: “SEC names Goldman Sachs exec to enforcement post—you can’t
make it up”).
46. See Jackie Calmes, President’s Economic Circle Keeps Tensions at a Simmer, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2009, at
A1; Dana Milbank, Op-Ed., Czar Trouble, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 2009, at A2.
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outrage is indeed healthy, boosting the internal capabilities and industry-specific
expertise of lawmakers is not synonymous with regulatory capture or self-regula-
tion; it is a necessary step to enhance lawmaker effectiveness. Just as internal corpo-
rate actors may be too close to problems to think critically about them, lawmakers
and other outside observers may rely on crude, readily available, heuristics, such as
share price, that do not provide adequate insight into the health of a corporate
organization.47 Outside observers often, out of necessity, are looking at aggregated
readily available information, but may fail to adequately identify problems at an
operational or micro level. Moreover, an outside regulator mindset, alone, may be
at odds with internal corporate values like trust and loyalty that are important to
the internal organization.48 Lawmakers, via harnessing internal expertise in the de-
sign of corporate reforms, may: function as a symmetrical debiasing mechanism
offsetting or countering predictable outsider biases;49 prevent unintended conse-
quences; promote more pragmatic, flexible, current, and forward-looking solu-
tions; enhance the legitimacy of resulting reforms; and  provide balance that may
deter hasty decisions that are inconsistent with internal corporate norms and
would dampen productivity, risk taking, and entrepreneurship.50 Moreover, inti-
mate knowledge of industry-specific operational processes could assist regulators in
prospectively identifying risky business practices and perhaps fraud.51
Despite these benefits, knowledge of these operational practices is often taken for
granted.52 Some of the most prominent corporate scandals over the past decade
have concerned operational issues that arguably could have been detected earlier, or
perhaps even prevented had regulators possessed intimate knowledge of corporate
operations across industry sectors. Consider Eliot Spitzer’s famed investigation of
47. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 807 (“Outsiders lack detailed knowledge of the firm’s inner workings
and are likely to use fairly heuristic forms of thought tied to readily observable data (for example, stock
prices).”).
48. Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from Hewlett-
Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 523, 570 (2008) (discussing how hiring former law enforce-
ment personnel may expose a company to deceptive practices, which may exacerbate the problems that corpo-
rate compliance departments are designed to solve); cf. Tamar Frankel, Trust and Honesty: America’s
Business Culture at a Crossroad 49–57, 116–17 (2006) (noting how a lack of trust and creating safeguards
increases the costs of doing business, and how a “trust but verify” attitude can actually encourage dishonest
behavior).
49. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 807.
50. Baer, supra note 48, at 570 (explaining that by hiring private law enforcement personnel, a company
may import public law enforcement values that conflict with the corporation’s internal culture).
51. See Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 905,
941–42 (2002) (“Knowledgeable insiders can identify abuses that public regulators do not even know to look
for.”).
52.  For example, corporate finance, although important, is usually a means to achieving operational ends.
And similarly, mergers are often conducted for the operational benefits such as achieving economies of scale,
expanding research and development, and boosting sales capabilities. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande,
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1580, 1599–600 (1983) (“[O]perating efficien-
cies such as those derived from economies of scale, resource allocation, technological complementaries . . . and
various kinds of transaction-cost economies . . . [are likely to arise] from horizontal or vertical mergers.”).
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Citigroup that unraveled abusive practices between Citigroup’s equity research and
investment banking units.53 Here, operational cross-selling practices and conflicts
figured prominently into the New York Attorney General’s investigation.54 Spitzer’s
unraveling of the abusive practices at Citigroup illustrates the importance of insider
operational knowledge. More recently, AIG’s operational practices involving the
sale of largely unregulated credit default swap derivatives to numerous counterpar-
ties not only subjected AIG to excessive risk, requiring a federal bailout, but also
introduced significant instability into the broader financial system.55
These above examples are instructive because they highlight the importance of
internal operational knowledge and the information asymmetry that exists between
corporate lawmakers and internal corporate actors. In order to detect and prevent
various modes of corporate opportunism, lawmakers need to harness valuable in-
ternal knowledge. Addressing the current information asymmetry requires ongoing
interaction between lawmakers and internal corporate actors. This type of interac-
tion differs from standard lobbying and notice and comment procedures.56 Instead,
the desired type of interaction is more discursive, continuous, cooperative, and
interactive where “[i]ndustry is expected to participate as part of a search for com-
mon goals, not just rigidly asserting its narrow economic or political interests.”57
This perspective bears a resemblance to new governance theories of institutional
reform that eschew an overly top-down approach and favor inside-out approaches
to institutional reform.58
53. See Brooke A. Masters, Spoiling for a Fight: The Rise of Eliot Spitzer 117–18 (2006) (provid-
ing detailed information about Spitzer’s investigations into several corporations, including Citigroup); see also
Citigroup Proposes Rules Limiting Conflicts, L.A. Times, July 16, 2002, § 3, at  4 (reporting that Mr. Spitzer
investigated analysts at Salomon and Morgan Stanley who tailored their public opinions of companies to win
lucrative banking work for their firms).
54. See Masters, supra note 53, at 262; Patrick McGeehan, Spitzer Sues Executives of Telecom Companies
Over ‘Ill Gotten’ Gains, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2002, at C1 (reporting that Mr. Spitzer prosecuted former top
officials of five telecommunications companies for steering investment banking business to Citigroup in ex-
change for inflated ratings on their companies’ stock and new shares of other companies).
55. See Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Firms to Which It Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
2009, at A1 (explaining that AIG’s investments in subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, and other shaky
loans exposed the company to high risk, and when AIG’s investments turned sour, the stability of the entire
financial system was jeopardized).
56. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 Admin. L.J. 317 (1989); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 390 (2004).
57. Lobel, supra note 56, at 377.
58. See id. (“The governance model thus views traditional patterns of hierarchical top-down regulatory
control as obsolete. It advocates instead the adoption of cooperative governance based on continuous interac-
tion and sharing of responsibility. It signifies a move to partnership, to horizontal relationships, and to two-
way communications.” (footnote omitted)).
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iv. the future?
The credence characteristics of corporate reform allow lawmakers greater latitude
to “straddle the fence between political symbolism and conscientious resolution.”59
Accordingly, corporate reform will most likely continue to evolve incrementally
without substantial shifts despite corporate scandals and economic turmoil.60 Mas-
sive reforms are often too risky because substantial lawmaker movements could
cause broad constituent backlash, expose ineptitude, and make lawmakers blame-
worthy.61 Perhaps the gravity of the current crisis will break this pattern, but less
desirable corporate constituents (including the public) should not hold their
breath. Even if the current crisis compels lawmakers to act in a non-opportunistic
fashion, deficits in expertise (e.g., internal operational knowledge) could under-
mine even the best intentions. The fraudulent expert and incompetent expert
problems must be addressed simultaneously.
59. Simmons, supra note 5, at 362.
60. Id. at 363.
61. Id.
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